An Impact Model of AI on the Principles of Justice: Encompassing the
  Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning by Eliot, Lance
1 
 
Abstract 
Efforts furthering the advancement of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) will increasingly encompass AI 
Legal Reasoning (AILR) as a crucial element in the 
practice of law. It is argued in this research paper that 
the infusion of AI into existing and future legal 
activities and the judicial structure needs to be 
undertaken by mindfully observing an alignment with 
the core principles of justice. As such, the adoption of 
AI has a profound twofold possibility of either 
usurping the principles of justice, doing so in a 
Dystopian manner, and yet also capable to bolster the 
principles of justice, doing so in a Utopian way. By 
examining the principles of justice across the Levels of 
Autonomy (LoA) of AI Legal Reasoning, the case is 
made that there is an ongoing tension underlying the 
efforts to develop and deploy AI that can 
demonstrably determine the impacts and sway upon 
each core principle of justice and the collective set. 
 
Keywords: AI, artificial intelligence, autonomy, 
autonomous levels, legal reasoning, law, lawyers, 
practice of law, principles of justice 
 
 
1 Background and Principles of Justice 
 
Efforts toward the advancement of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) will increasingly encompass AI 
Legal Reasoning (AILR) as a crucial element in the 
practice of law [1] [7] [17] [31] [45]. It is argued in 
this research paper that the infusion of AI into existing 
and future legal activities and the judicial structure 
needs to be undertaken by mindfully observing an 
alignment with the core principles of justice. 
 
This research paper examines the nature of the core 
principles of justice in Section 1. In Section 2, a 
framework for the Levels of Autonomy (LoA) of AI 
Legal Reasoning (AILR) is depicted. Then, in Section 
3, the core principles of justice are aligned across the 
LoA AILR to showcase an anticipated evolution, 
along with identifying corresponding outcome facets. 
Section 4 provides additional considerations and 
proffers insights for conducting further research on 
these matters. 
 
The sections in this paper are: 
• Section 1: Background and Principles of Justice 
• Section 2: Autonomous Levels of AI Legal  
                  Reasoning 
• Section 3: Grids and Analyses of Justice 
                 Principles and LoA AILR 
• Section 4: Additional Considerations and 
                 Future Research 
 
One important assertion in this discussion is that a 
multi-faceted perspective should be undertaken when 
considering how AI will shape or reshape the 
instantiation of the principles of justice [7] [9] [29]. A 
commonly assumed false dichotomy is that the 
adoption of AI into the practice of law will be 
exclusively Dystopian or exclusively Utopian, 
meanwhile, it is argued herein that either possibility 
can arise, doing so amid each distinct principle of 
justice, additionally collectively so too, and that it is 
incumbent upon the developers and adopters of AI in 
the law to observe and be attune to which direction 
their efforts are converging [19] [38] [42]. 
 
As such, the adoption of AI has a profound twofold 
possibility of either usurping the principles of justice, 
doing so in a Dystopian manner, and yet also capable 
to bolster the principles of justice, doing so in a 
Utopian way. By examining the principles of justice 
An Impact Model of AI on the Principles of Justice: 
 Encompassing the Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning 
 
 
Dr. Lance B. Eliot 
Chief AI Scientist, Techbruim; Fellow, CodeX: Stanford Center for Legal Informatics 
Stanford, California, USA 
 
2 
 
across the Levels of Autonomy (LoA) of AI Legal 
Reasoning, the case is made that there is an ongoing 
tension underlying the efforts to develop and deploy 
AI that can demonstrably determine how each core 
principle of justice will be swayed. 
 
 
1.1 identifying the Principles of Justice 
 
Research by Susskind [44] in his book entitled “Online 
Courts and the Future of Justice” lays out an 
extensively established foundation that justice can be 
generally cast as consisting of seven core principles. 
Based on those key principles, his primary focus in the 
book entails an expounded argument that the 
emergence of online courts will both preserve justice 
and enhance justice, doing so via the prudent 
utilization of virtual hearings, plus asynchronous 
online judging, etc. He notably forewarns that it is not 
a foregone conclusion that such benefits will arise and 
that it will require sensible, determined, and systemic 
multi-generational adaptations to reach those 
aspirational goals. 
 
For this research paper, the same set of core principles 
of justice will be utilized. This makes sense to do so 
herein in that the groundwork supporting the 
contention that those principles are indeed a bona fide 
and sufficient set of core principles has already been 
robustly well-established and therefore can be readily 
leveraged in a building blocks fashion accordingly, 
effectively and efficiently so (rather than trying to 
reinvent the wheel, as it were).  
 
The emphasis herein will be to apply the emergence of 
AI into the practice of law amidst the core principles 
of justice and thus is a separate and distinct usage and 
analysis associated with the principles of justice in 
comparison to the work by Susskind that focused on 
the rise of online courts. Note that Susskind also 
identifies the significant role that AI will undoubtedly 
ultimately play: “In contemplating the second 
generation of online courts, it would be hard to ignore 
the recent upsurge of interest in artificial intelligence 
(AI) for lawyers and judges.” It is that same 
observation of the arising spark in attention toward AI 
in the practice of the law that this research paper 
dovetails into. Similar to Susskind’s argument that 
online courts will not axiomatically enable the 
principles of justice, and indeed might deter or 
undermine them, the same case is made herein that AI 
will variously have such results upon the principles of 
justice and that no foregone conclusion can 
conclusively be otherwise decreed or assumed. 
 
The seven indicated core principles of justice consist 
of: 
• Substantive Justice 
• Procedural Justice 
• Open Justice 
• Distributive Justice 
• Proportionate Justice 
• Enforceable Justice 
• Sustainable Justice 
 
 
Note that the seven principles are not numbered and 
nor otherwise indicated as being prioritized or ranked 
in any particular order. They are all equally crucial. 
Imagine a three-legged stool that falls apart when any 
of the legs is missing, though in this instance envisage 
a seven-legged apparatus. There are tradeoffs among 
the principles, and it is not easy to ensure that they are 
each given their full and earnestly needed equal 
attention. Keep in mind too that existing attempts at 
justice are not necessarily able to live up to the ideals 
of the stated principles, and thus today’s form of 
justice is undeniably at times existent of numerous 
shortcomings, including being too costly, taking too 
long, being unintelligible for many that rely upon the 
law, etc. 
 
This emphasizes that today’s barometer of justice is 
not somehow already affixed at the topmost stance 
[23] [31] [41]. If it were, the addition or incorporation 
of innovation such as the integration of AI could be 
argued as potentially messing with perfection, but this 
is not the case per se.  
 
AI offers a chance of improving the day-to-day 
incurring and delivery of justice. In that same vein, if 
AI is improperly or inappropriately integrated, the 
existing justice system could be degraded, dropping 
from the place upon which it currently resides [8] [43]. 
 
Each of the next subsections examines each of the 
respective core principles of justice. 
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1.1.1   Substantive Justice 
 
Here is an overall definition of substantive justice: 
 
Substantive Justice: Decisions and outcomes should 
be considered fair and substantive, requiring 
judging to be based on the laws of the land and not 
by whim or other divines. 
 
Substantive justice is about fairness, and also about the 
predictability of the law and what it portends [44]: “It 
is only fair that we are judged in accordance with 
whatever legislation and case law require of us. It is 
important in our daily activities that the law is to a 
great extent certain and predictable. Justice requires 
that judges apply law as it is, rather than what they or 
others think it ought to be.” Also, since it is 
presumably possible that laws might be inherently 
unjust in some absolute or relativist respect, an 
additional criteria is that the laws as enacted and 
intended should be intrinsically stitched with being 
just [44]: “We should also insist that our justice system 
delivers outcomes that are themselves just.” 
 
1.1.2 Procedural Justice 
 
Here is an overall definition of procedural justice: 
 
Procedural Justice: The process needs to be 
equitable and honest, independent of biases, and 
proffer procedures that avert the incursion of 
defectiveness or inconsistencies. 
 
Procedural justice is about the process by which 
justice is adjudicated, and for which if the process is 
skewed or malformed it can undermine and diminish 
the attainment of justice [44]: “A decision is 
considered unjust because it was handled in a manner 
that was in some way defective and inequitable.” 
Within the overarching realm of procedural justice, at 
least two cornerstones are consisting of formal justice 
and natural justice. The nature of formal justice is that 
there should be a consistency of like cases being 
handled in an equivalent manner [44]: “One aspect of 
this concept is referred to as ‘formal justice,’ which is 
often characterized by some such phrase as ‘like cases 
should be treated alike.’” For natural justice, it is key 
that a case be heard and that self-judging is to be 
averted [44]: “A second aspect of procedural justice is 
known as ‘natural justice.’ I am using this term in a 
technical sense, frequently captured in two Latin 
phrases: audi alteram partem, which requires that all 
litigants should be given the opportunity to state and 
defend their cases and nemo index in causa sua, which 
means that no-one should be a judge in his or her own 
case.” 
 
1.1.3 Open Justice 
 
Here is an overall definition of open justice: 
 
Open Justice: Efforts of the courts must be 
transparent, open to scrutiny, accountable, and 
intelligible, avoiding secrecy as much as can be so 
reasonably achieved (realizing that at times national 
security, the welfare of minors, and the like can 
motivate some degrees of confidentiality). 
 
Open justice entails ensuring that processes and 
activities are made highly visible and shall not be 
unduly disguised or hidden [44]: “We object to court 
systems whose workings are held in private or cloaked 
in secrecy. We call loudly for demystification.” Not all 
proceedings are necessarily prudent to be completely 
visible and therefore exceptions of an appropriate kind 
might need to be accounted for, but only to the extent 
as absolutely necessary since embracing transparency 
is the crux. An offshoot of the visibility aspect is that 
justice and all its mechanizations should be intelligible 
to those that are non-lawyers and thus likely 
unfamiliar with the nomenclature and complexities of 
the law [44]: “There are strong arguments in support 
of the view that open justice also requires any 
information and data findings about the courts, as well 
as the court proceedings themselves, to be 
understandable to non-lawyers.” 
 
1.1.4 Distributive Justice 
 
Here is an overall definition of distributive justice:  
 
Distributive Justice: Each person must be given 
their legal due and afforded access to justice, thus 
driving a semblance of distributiveness to ensure 
that regardless of means that all can gain access. 
 
Distributive justice entails seeking to make access to 
justice feasible since otherwise, denial of access is 
essentially no different from an altogether lack of 
justice itself [44]: “Distributive justice requires that 
court service is accessible and intelligible to all; that 
access to legal and court services is a benefit that is 
4 
 
evenly spread across society; that rights and duties are 
equably allocated; that the powerful and rich are 
subject to the same law as the less well-off and less 
powerful; and that the service is affordable by all 
regardless of their means.” 
 
 
1.1.5 Proportionate Justice 
 
Here is an overall definition of proportionate justice: 
 
Proportionate Justice: Fairness ought to arise at 
scale, straightforward processes for straightforward 
issues, attempting to ensure that speediness occurs 
and aligns too with complexity, suitable 
proportionality based on the assertion that justice 
delayed is justice diluted. 
 
Proportionality is a less often enumerated component 
of justice and tends to be assumed as existent or 
deemed as unworthy of being an essential element of 
justice and can be perhaps cast as a secondary 
condition, but here it is viewed as equally vital as the 
other principles. In brief, the notion is that the energy 
or effort of achieving justice should be proportional to 
the nature or magnitude of the underlying dispute for 
which justice is being sought, thus [44]: “The principle 
of proportionality requires, first of all, that we should 
ensure that the cost of handling individual cases in our 
courts makes sense by reference to the nature and 
value of each dispute.” And, regarding our revered 
adversarial approach [44]: “In a similar vein, although 
our system is adversarial, this should not mean that all 
disputes are conducted in a highly combative spirit. 
Unwarranted escalation of disputes, especially in 
smaller cases, should be discouraged.” 
 
 
1.1.6 Enforceable Justice 
 
Here is an overall definition of enforceable justice: 
 
Enforceable Justice: Results need to have teeth and 
be seen as binding, enforcement as enabled via the 
coercive power of the state, correctly deprive money 
and property and liberty to ensure justice is served. 
 
Enforceable justice entails the need to ensure that 
justice must not be hollow, namely that if there was no 
means or mechanism to enforce or bind the ascertained 
results then there would be no consequent impact or 
effect per se of having sought justice. In a sense, 
justice would have no semblance of potency since it 
could not be otherwise implemented or compelled 
[44]: “The determination of judges are binding and can 
be enforced by the coercive power of the state.” And 
without such implementations, there would seem little 
reason for society to avail themselves of relying upon 
the efforts of the judiciary: “Without enforceable 
justice, the law runs the risk of affording a rather weak 
set of protections.” 
 
 
1.1.7   Sustainable Justice 
 
Here is an overall definition of sustainable justice: 
 
Sustainable Justice: Have a stable basis for the 
ongoing instantiation of justice, sufficient resources 
must be allocated to maintain and incur upkeep for 
continually improving the means of the courts to act, 
including being able to demonstrably scale to 
whatever volume of cases might be presented. 
 
Sustainable justice necessitates the somewhat abstract 
but very real notion that justice and all of its elements 
must be in existence; otherwise, if it is intermittent or 
known to be unreliably sustained then such justice 
cannot be depended upon [44]: “Courts should be safe 
havens; solid and reliable; anchors to which, in times 
of need, people and organizations can confidently 
tether themselves.” As an aside, it can be asserted that 
the sustainability of justice also intertwines with the 
technological capabilities of those being served [44]: 
“It is also hard to conceive of a truly sustainable court 
system that is not technologically in tune with the 
communities that it serves.” 
 
 
2 Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning 
 
In this section, a framework for the autonomous levels 
of AI Legal Reasoning is summarized and is based on 
the research described in detail in Eliot [20].  
 
These autonomous levels will be portrayed in a grid 
that aligns with key elements of autonomy and as 
matched to AI Legal Reasoning. Providing this context 
will be useful to the later sections of this paper and 
will be utilized accordingly. 
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The autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning are as 
follows: 
Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
2.1 Details of the LoA AILR 
 
See Figure A-1 for an overview chart showcasing the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning as via 
columns denoting each of the respective levels. 
 
See Figure A-2 for an overview chart similar to Figure 
A-1 which alternatively is indicative of the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning via the rows 
as depicting the respective levels (this is simply a 
reformatting of Figure A-1, doing so to aid in 
illuminating this variant perspective, but does not 
introduce any new facets or alterations from the 
contents as already shown in Figure A-1). 
 
2.1.1 Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 0 is considered the no automation level. Legal 
reasoning is carried out via manual methods and 
principally occurs via paper-based methods.  
 
This level is allowed some leeway in that the use of 
say a simple handheld calculator or perhaps the use of 
a fax machine could be allowed or included within this 
Level 0, though strictly speaking it could be said that 
any form whatsoever of automation is to be excluded 
from this level. 
 
2.1.2 Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 1 consists of simple assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this category encompassing simple 
automation would include the use of everyday 
computer-based word processing, the use of everyday 
computer-based spreadsheets, the access to online 
legal documents that are stored and retrieved 
electronically, and so on. 
 
By-and-large, today’s use of computers for legal 
activities is predominantly within Level 1. It is 
assumed and expected that over time, the 
pervasiveness of automation will continue to deepen 
and widen, and eventually lead to legal activities being 
supported and within Level 2, rather than Level 1. 
 
2.1.3 Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 2 consists of advanced assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning. 
 
Examples of this notion encompassing advanced 
automation would include the use of query-style 
Natural Language Processing (NLP), Machine 
Learning (ML) for case predictions, and so on. 
 
Gradually, over time, it is expected that computer-
based systems for legal activities will increasingly 
make use of advanced automation. Law industry 
technology that was once at a Level 1 will likely be 
refined, upgraded, or expanded to include advanced 
capabilities, and thus be reclassified into Level 2. 
 
2.1.4 Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 3 consists of semi-autonomous automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this notion encompassing semi-
autonomous automation would include the use of 
Knowledge-Based Systems (KBS) for legal reasoning, 
the use of Machine Learning and Deep Learning 
(ML/DL) for legal reasoning, and so on. 
 
Today, such automation tends to exist in research 
efforts or prototypes and pilot systems, along with 
some commercial legal technology that has been 
infusing these capabilities too.  
 
2.1.5 Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 4 consists of domain autonomous computer-
based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
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This level reuses the conceptual notion of Operational 
Design Domains (ODDs) as utilized in the 
autonomous vehicles and self-driving cars levels of 
autonomy, though in this use case it is being applied to 
the legal domain [17] [18] [20].  
 
Essentially, this entails any AI legal reasoning 
capacities that can operate autonomously, entirely so, 
but that is only able to do so in some limited or 
constrained legal domain. 
 
2.1.6 Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 5 consists of fully autonomous computer-based 
systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 5 is the superset of Level 4 in terms 
of encompassing all possible domains as per however 
so defined ultimately for Level 4. The only constraint, 
as it were, consists of the facet that the Level 4 and 
Level 5 are concerning human intelligence and the 
capacities thereof. This is an important emphasis due 
to attempting to distinguish Level 5 from Level 6 (as 
will be discussed in the next subsection) 
 
It is conceivable that someday there might be a fully 
autonomous AI legal reasoning capability, one that 
encompasses all of the law in all foreseeable ways, 
though this is quite a tall order and remains quite 
aspirational without a clear cut path of how this might 
one day be achieved. Nonetheless, it seems to be 
within the extended realm of possibilities, which is 
worthwhile to mention in relative terms to Level 6. 
 
2.1.7 Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 6 consists of superhuman autonomous 
computer-based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 6 is the entirety of Level 5 and adds 
something beyond that in a manner that is currently ill-
defined and perhaps (some would argue) as yet 
unknowable. The notion is that AI might ultimately 
exceed human intelligence, rising to become 
superhuman, and if so, we do not yet have any viable 
indication of what that superhuman intelligence 
consists of and nor what kind of thinking it would 
somehow be able to undertake. 
 
Whether a Level 6 is ever attainable is reliant upon 
whether superhuman AI is ever attainable, and thus, at 
this time, this stands as a placeholder for that which 
might never occur. In any case, having such a 
placeholder provides a semblance of completeness, 
doing so without necessarily legitimatizing that 
superhuman AI is going to be achieved or not. No such 
claim or dispute is undertaken within this framework. 
 
 
3 Grids and Analyses of the Principles of Justice 
and LoA AILR 
 
In this section, the autonomous levels of AI Legal 
Reasoning will be aligned with the principles of 
justice, forming a grid that is indicative of how AI 
might impact the principles and likewise how the 
principles can be utilized to drive the development and 
maturation of AI for the law. As for nomenclature, the 
nature of impacts involving the LoA AILR on the 
principles of justice is abbreviated as LoA-principles, 
while the impacts of the principles of justice on the 
LoA AILR is denoted as principles-LoA.   
 
3.1 Principles of Justice and the LoA AILR 
 
As shown in Figure B-1, it is useful and informative 
to align the seven core principles of justice with the 
seven levels of autonomy of AI Legal Reasoning. An 
explanation of the grid and its significance is discussed 
next.  
 
For Level 0, Level 1, and Level 2, the grid indicates 
that the alignment is considered as “Traditional” in the 
sense that since the level of automation is conventional 
at those levels of LoA this ergo suggests that any 
impacts on or of the principles of justice consist of 
what we already generally know and anticipate. Level 
3 is the first turning point as it is considered the semi-
autonomous LoA and thus is expressed as 
“Emerging,” which means that the impacts will start to 
become notable about the autonomy that might then 
emerge or exist once the Level 4 and above are 
achieved. Level 4 is the AILR domain autonomous 
level and the impacts are denoted as Phase X, which is 
explained in subsequent charts. Level 5 is the AILR 
fully autonomous level and the impacts are denoted as 
Phase Y, which is explained in subsequent charts. 
Level 6 is the AILR superhuman autonomous level 
and the impacts are denoted as Phase Z, which is 
explained in subsequent charts. 
7 
 
In a recap of this grid: 
 
Substantive Justice 
• Level 0: Traditional 
• Level 1: Traditional 
• Level 2: Traditional 
• Level 3: Emerging 
• Level 4: Phase X Impacts 
• Level 5: Phase Y Impacts 
• Level 6: Phase Z Impacts 
 
Procedural Justice 
• Level 0: Traditional 
• Level 1: Traditional 
• Level 2: Traditional 
• Level 3: Emerging 
• Level 4: Phase X Impacts 
• Level 5: Phase Y Impacts 
• Level 6: Phase Z Impacts 
 
Open Justice 
• Level 0: Traditional 
• Level 1: Traditional 
• Level 2: Traditional 
• Level 3: Emerging 
• Level 4: Phase X Impacts 
• Level 5: Phase Y Impacts 
• Level 6: Phase Z Impacts 
 
Distributive Justice 
• Level 0: Traditional 
• Level 1: Traditional 
• Level 2: Traditional 
• Level 3: Emerging 
• Level 4: Phase X Impacts 
• Level 5: Phase Y Impacts 
• Level 6: Phase Z Impacts 
 
Proportionate Justice 
• Level 0: Traditional 
• Level 1: Traditional 
• Level 2: Traditional 
• Level 3: Emerging 
• Level 4: Phase X Impacts 
• Level 5: Phase Y Impacts 
• Level 6: Phase Z Impacts 
 
Enforceable Justice 
• Level 0: Traditional 
• Level 1: Traditional 
• Level 2: Traditional 
• Level 3: Emerging 
• Level 4: Phase X Impacts 
• Level 5: Phase Y Impacts 
• Level 6: Phase Z Impacts 
 
Sustainable Justice 
• Level 0: Traditional 
• Level 1: Traditional 
• Level 2: Traditional 
• Level 3: Emerging 
• Level 4: Phase X Impacts 
• Level 5: Phase Y Impacts 
• Level 6: Phase Z Impacts 
 
Figure B-2 is akin to Figure B-1, illustrating the same 
grid but with the LoA along the rows and the core 
principles of justice indicated as the columns. This is 
not a new introduction of facets and instead merely a 
convenient means of representing the content in a 
flipped format for ease of reference and furtherance to 
the discussion. 
 
In a recap of the grid: 
 
 Level 0: No Automation 
• Substantive Justice: Traditional 
• Procedural Justice: Traditional 
• Open Justice: Traditional 
• Distributive Justice: Traditional 
• Proportionate Justice: Traditional 
• Enforceable Justice: Traditional 
• Sustainable Justice: Traditional 
 
Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation 
• Substantive Justice: Traditional 
• Procedural Justice: Traditional 
• Open Justice: Traditional 
• Distributive Justice: Traditional 
• Proportionate Justice: Traditional 
• Enforceable Justice: Traditional 
• Sustainable Justice: Traditional 
 
Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation 
• Substantive Justice: Traditional 
• Procedural Justice: Traditional 
• Open Justice: Traditional 
• Distributive Justice: Traditional 
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• Proportionate Justice: Traditional 
• Enforceable Justice: Traditional 
• Sustainable Justice: Traditional 
 
Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation 
• Substantive Justice: Emerging 
• Procedural Justice: Emerging 
• Open Justice: Emerging 
• Distributive Justice: Emerging 
• Proportionate Justice: Emerging 
• Enforceable Justice: Emerging 
• Sustainable Justice: Emerging 
 
Level 4: AILR Domain Autonomous 
• Substantive Justice: Phase X Impacts 
• Procedural Justice: Phase X Impacts 
• Open Justice: Phase X Impacts 
• Distributive Justice: Phase X Impacts 
• Proportionate Justice: Phase X Impacts 
• Enforceable Justice: Phase X Impacts 
• Sustainable Justice: Phase X Impacts 
 
Level 5: AILR Fully Autonomous 
• Substantive Justice: Phase Y Impacts 
• Procedural Justice: Phase Y Impacts 
• Open Justice: Phase Y Impacts 
• Distributive Justice: Phase Y Impacts 
• Proportionate Justice: Phase Y Impacts 
• Enforceable Justice: Phase Y Impacts 
• Sustainable Justice: Phase Y Impacts 
 
Level 6: AILR Superhuman Autonomous 
• Substantive Justice: Phase Z Impacts 
• Procedural Justice: Phase Z Impacts 
• Open Justice: Phase Z Impacts 
• Distributive Justice: Phase Z Impacts 
• Proportionate Justice: Phase Z Impacts 
• Enforceable Justice: Phase Z Impacts 
• Sustainable Justice: Phase Z Impacts 
 
 
3.2 AI Infusion and Potential Outcomes 
 
Shown in Figure B-3 is an indication of the seven core 
principles of justice and the notable aspect that the AI 
infusion can be construed in a twofold manner, 
consisting of outcomes that give rise to Utopian results 
and also consisting of outcomes that give rise to 
Dystopian results.  
These are not to be considered as mutually exclusive 
of each other, in the sense that the results can vary, 
both by the distinct principles of justice, each 
individually so, and also collectively across the entire 
set. It is postulated that the results will be 
differentiated across the LoA AILR in the sense that 
there is a measured difference between the Level 4, 
Level 5, and Level 6, thus each of those level 
distinctions is given a phasing, respectively indicated 
as Phase X, Phase Y, and Phase Z (as will be 
explained further in the next subsection). 
 
Note that this is not a prescriptive indication and thus 
there is no suggestion, implication, or proclamation 
that there will be Utopian results, nor that there will be 
Dystopian results, and that instead this is providing a 
means of being able to both reactively assess the 
results of AI infusion and can also be proactively used 
to drive the directional nature of an AI infusion into 
the law. 
 
 
3.3 Phase X, Phase Y, Phase Z 
 
Shown in Figure B-4 is an indication of the seven core 
principles and the respective Phase X, Phase Y, and 
Phase Z indications. Within each Level, the respective 
phase showcases the possibility of a Utopian outcome 
and a Dystopian outcome, per each of the respective 
core principles of justice. Note that the wording is 
evocative of being more so or less of the characteristic 
stated, such as the word “fairer” to indicate that the 
outcome would potentially be heightened in fairness, 
while the word “unfairer” to indicate that the outcome 
would potentially be heightened in unfairness. 
 
Phase X is designated as the impacts at Level 4 and 
consists of: 
 
Phase X: Level 4 
Substantive Justice 
Utopian: Fairer Decisions (law domains) 
Dystopian: Unfairer Decisions (law domains) 
 
Phase X: Level 4 
Procedural Justice 
Utopian: Fairer Processes (law domains) 
Dystopian: Unfairer Processes (law domains) 
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Phase X: Level 4 
Open Justice 
Utopian: Greater Transparency (law domains) 
Dystopian: Lessened Transparency (law domains) 
 
Phase X: Level 4 
Distributive Justice 
Utopian: Expanded Access (law domains) 
Dystopian: Reduced Access (law domains) 
 
Phase X: Level 4 
Proportionate Justice 
Utopian: More Balanced (law domains) 
Dystopian: Less Balanced (law domains) 
 
Phase X: Level 4 
Enforceable Justice 
Utopian: Better Enforcement (law domains) 
Dystopian: Worse Enforcement (law domains) 
 
Phase X: Level 4 
Sustainable Justice 
Utopian: Greater Stability (law domains) 
Dystopian: Lessened Stability (law domains) 
 
Phase Y is designated as the impacts at Level 5 and 
consists of: 
 
Phase Y: Level 5 
Substantive Justice 
Utopian: Fairer Decisions (all of law) 
Dystopian: Unfairer Decisions (all of law) 
 
Phase Y: Level 5 
Procedural Justice 
Utopian: Fairer Processes (all of law) 
Dystopian: Unfairer Processes (all of law) 
 
Phase Y: Level 5 
Open Justice 
Utopian: Greater Transparency (all of law) 
Dystopian: Lessened Transparency (all of law) 
Phase Y: Level 5 
Distributive Justice 
Utopian: Expanded Access (all of law) 
Dystopian: Reduced Access (all of law) 
Phase Y: Level 5 
Proportionate Justice 
Utopian: More Balanced (all of law) 
Dystopian: Less Balanced (all of law) 
 
Phase Y: Level 5 
Enforceable Justice 
Utopian: Better Enforcement (all of law) 
Dystopian: Worse Enforcement (all of law) 
 
Phase Y: Level 5 
Sustainable Justice 
Utopian: Greater Stability (all of law) 
Dystopian: Lessened Stability (all of law) 
 
 
Phase Z is designated as the impacts at Level 6 and 
consists of: 
 
Phase Z: Level 6 
Substantive Justice 
Utopian: Ultra-Fair Decisions 
Dystopian: Ultra-Unfair Decisions 
 
Phase Z: Level 6 
Procedural Justice 
Utopian: Ultra-Fair Processes 
Dystopian: Ultra-Unfair Processes 
 
Phase Z: Level 6 
Open Justice 
Utopian: Ultimate Transparency 
Dystopian: Utmost Opaqueness 
 
Phase Z: Level 6 
Distributive Justice 
Utopian: Totality of Access 
Dystopian: Utter Denial of Access 
 
Phase Z: Level 6 
Proportionate Justice 
Utopian: Perfectly Balanced 
Dystopian: Wholly Unbalanced 
 
Phase Z: Level 6 
Enforceable Justice 
Utopian: Idea Enforcement 
Dystopian: Horrendous Enforcement 
 
Phase Z: Level 6 
Sustainable Justice 
Utopian: Completely Sustainable 
Dystopian: Entirely Unsustainable 
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3.4 Examples of Impacts Analysis 
 
When considering how AI infusion will potentially 
impact justice, the grids can be substantively 
conducive in at least two ways: (a) conducting an 
impact analysis anew, and (b) used when evaluating an 
existing impact analysis that is being presented by a 
given research study. 
 
For any such analyses, questions to be asked and 
appropriately addressed include: 
• Which of the core principles of justice is being 
included? 
• Which of the core principles of justice is not 
being included and how might that omission 
alter the otherwise predicted impacts? 
• Is the tension and balancing among the core 
principles of justice being encompassed? 
• At what level of AI autonomy is the focus being 
undertaken? 
• To what degree and nature do the AI impact a 
specific principle of justice? 
• How does the AI impact across the core set of 
principles of justice? 
• Is a predominantly Utopian perspective being 
assumed? 
• Is a predominantly Dystopian perspective being 
assumed? 
• Does the analysis consider the separate impact 
by core principle rather than as a monolith? 
• Does the analysis consider the collective 
impacts encompassing the set of principles? 
• And so on. 
 
Suppose for example that a research study has asserted 
that AI will lead to fairer decisions by the justice 
system. Consider using the grids to examine and assess 
the conclusion reached by this exemplar. 
 
As viewed within the context of the grids, this might 
be equated with an assertion that entails Substantive 
Justice (due to invoking the notion of fairness in 
decisions) and posits a Utopian leaning impact (due to 
avowing that decisions will be fairer, rather than just 
as fair or perhaps even turning toward unfair). If so, 
there should presumably be a rational or justification 
provided in the research study as to not only why the 
Utopian leaning is warranted as an outcome, but would 
also need to ascertain why the Dystopian is unlikely to 
occur in lieu of the Utopian claim. 
 
Meanwhile, this still leaves unstated by the research 
study as to what level of AI is being assumed, such as 
whether this is at a level below the autonomous levels 
of Level 4, Level 5, or Level 6, or those respective 
levels. This exposes a weakness in the impacts being 
alleged since the magnitude and scope of the AI 
infusion is either omitted or otherwise not explicitly 
addressed. Furthermore, focusing on just one principle, 
in this example the Substantive Justice principle, 
entirely undercuts the dependency nature of the core 
principles among each other. If there are apparently 
going to be fairer decisions in the realm of Substantive 
Justice, this might come at the cost of perhaps unfairer 
processes (i.e., worsened Procedural Justice) or at the 
cost of less Open Justice (lessened transparency), and 
so on. By consulting the grid, it becomes readily 
feasible to directly seek to discover whether a research 
study has covered the range of principles of justice. By 
the happenstance or oversight of not considering the 
full range, it is conceivable that a presumed 
optimization at one principle could seemingly 
undercut the performance on one or more of the other 
principles. 
 
These grids then provide a tool or model for the 
pursuit of research on the impacts of AI on the 
principles of justice and the impacts of the principles 
on the development and deployment of AI. 
 
 
4 Additional Considerations and Future Research 
 
As earlier stated, efforts toward the advancement of 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) will increasingly 
encompass AI Legal Reasoning (AILR) as a crucial 
element in the practice of law. It has been argued in 
this research paper that the infusion of AI into existing 
and future legal activities and the judicial structure 
needs to be undertaken by mindfully observing an 
alignment with the core principles of justice. The 
adoption of AI has a profound twofold possibility of 
either usurping the principles of justice, doing so in a 
Dystopian manner, and yet also capable to bolster the 
principles of justice, doing so in a Utopian way.  
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Any research examining the principles of justice and 
AI must strive to be as complete and cohesive as 
feasible, for which the grids provided in this paper are 
a proffered tool(s) or model(s) to be so productively 
utilized. Future research for evolving these tools or 
models provided is highly recommended. This might 
consist of the following types of studies: 
• Conduct case studies using the tools or models 
• Analyze existing research studies using the 
tools or models 
• Craft new research that encompasses the tools 
or models 
• Propose extensions to the tools or models 
• Other 
 
By considering the principles of justice across the 
Levels of Autonomy (LoA) of AI Legal Reasoning, 
and then addressing the singular facets of each 
principle, along with the collective set, research in this 
realm will assuredly be more robust. Also, undertaking 
such analyses will allow for greater comparison of 
such research studies, readily revealing which 
assumptions are being made, including any omissions 
or oversights, and aid in bolstering the state of 
research on these matters. 
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Figure B-2 
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Figure B-3 
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Figure B-4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
